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GENDER INEQUALITY IN IMMIGRATION
LAW: WHY A PARENT’S GENDER SHOULD
NOT DETERMINE A CHILD’S CITIZENSHIP
ALEXANDRA STRUZZIERI†
INTRODUCTION
“There are ‘two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth
and naturalization.’ ”1 Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, individuals born in the United States
are citizens by birth.2 Individuals born outside the United States
can become citizens if they are naturalized within the United
States.3 However, some individuals born outside the United
States are automatically citizens at birth, by virtue of the
citizenship of the individual’s parents.4 This is called derivative
citizenship.5 To confer derivative citizenship to a child born
abroad, the citizen parents must have been physically present in
the United States for a certain period of time.6 For unwed
parents, the process of conferring citizenship becomes more
complex.7 In that context, whether or not a child born abroad is
considered a citizen is determined largely by the gender of the
United States citizen parent.

†
Senior Staff, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2017, St. John’s
University School of Law.
1
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 423 (1998) (quoting United States v. Wong
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702 (1898)).
2
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born . . . in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States . . . .”).
3
Id. (“All persons . . . naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States . . . .”).
4
See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (2012).
5
Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Unlike
citizenship by naturalization, derivative citizenship exists as of a child’s birth or not
at all.”).
6
See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c).
7
See id. §§ 1401, 1409(c).
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Consider the following hypotheticals as an illustration. X
was born outside the United States, but was brought to the
United States a few days after his birth by his father, a United
States citizen. X was raised by his father in the United States.
Years later, X is convicted of various crimes and is subjected to a
deportation proceeding. X wishes to assert as a defense to the
deportation that he is a citizen by birth because of the derivative
citizenship his father conferred to him. However, because X’s
father only lived in the United States for nine years prior to X’s
birth, he does not meet the ten-year physical presence
requirement imposed on fathers in order to confer citizenship on
a child. Therefore, X is not considered a citizen and is deported.
Next, consider Y. Y was also born outside the United States,
but unlike X, Y lives abroad for most of his life. Y eventually
moves to the United States and shortly thereafter is convicted of
various crimes and subjected to a deportation proceeding. Y
asserts the defense of derivative citizenship and is successful.
This is because Y’s mother, a United States citizen, lived in the
United States for one year when she was a child, although she
never lived in the United States again after that. Because there
is a one-year physical presence requirement imposed on mothers,
as opposed to ten years imposed on fathers, Y is considered a
citizen by birth. Therefore, Y is a citizen and is not deported.
Both scenarios illustrate that an individual’s derivative
citizenship is based on the gender of that individual’s citizen
parent. For example, in the first hypothetical, if X’s mother,
instead of his father, were the United States citizen, X would
have been considered a citizen.
Similarly, in the second
hypothetical, if Y’s father, instead of his mother, were the United
States citizen, Y would not have been considered a citizen.
Although X and Y may not be the most sympathetic defendants,
there is an inherent inequality in the law that governs their
citizenship.
The law takes two similarly situated groups,
(1) unwed citizen mothers of a child born abroad and (2) unwed
citizen fathers of a child born abroad, and makes durational
distinctions based on the gender of that parent. Thus, the effect
of the law is to favor the citizenship of a child whose mother is a
United States citizen, even if she had only lived in the United
States for one year, over the citizenship of a child whose father is
a United States citizen, even if he resided there for a much
longer duration.
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The specific statutory provisions illustrated above are
modeled after §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”).8 The INA imposes a ten-year
durational requirement on an unwed citizen father of which five
of those years must be obtained after the father is fourteen years
old, but imposes a one-year durational requirement on an unwed
mother, without any limitation on when that one year occurred.9
This Note analyzes the United States Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence with regard to gender-based distinctions in the
INA as well as the current circuit split over the constitutionality
of §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(a). This Note concludes that the
distinctions in §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(a) impermissibly
discriminate on the basis of gender and, therefore, violate the
Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection.
Part I provides a background of equal protection principles,
including the well-established standard the Supreme Court uses
in analyzing gender discrimination claims. Part I also illustrates
Supreme Court precedent by discussing three important cases
dealing with gender discrimination in the INA. Part II presents
§§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(c) and describes the current split of
authority among the circuit courts over the constitutionality of
those provisions.
Part III details why the gender-based
distinctions in the INA are unconstitutional and proposes a
gender-neutral solution to remedy the constitutional violation.

8
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(7), 1409(c) (1952). Unless otherwise noted,
“[§§] 1401(a)(7)” and “[§] 1409(c)” refer to the provisions of the 1952 Act.
9
Section 1401(a)(7) states:
The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at
birth: . . . a person born outside the geographical limits of the United States
and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the
other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person,
was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a
period or periods totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which
were after attaining the age of fourteen years.
Id. § 1401(a)(7). Section 1409(c) provides the physical presence requirement for
citizen mothers:
Notwithstanding [Section 1409(a)(7)], a person born, on or after the
effective date of this chapter, outside the United States and out of wedlock
shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality status of his mother,
if the mother had the nationality of the United States at the time of such
person’s birth, and if the mother had previously been physically present in
the United States or one of its outlying possession for a continuous period
of one year.
Id. § 1409(c).
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Equal Protection Principles and Standards of Review

When a federal law is challenged for discriminating or
creating classifications based on gender, that law is subject to a
heightened, or intermediate, form of review10 to determine
whether it violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal
protection.11 Under this standard of review, the government
must show that the “classification serves ‘important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means
employed’ are ‘substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.’ ”12 The justification for the classification “must be
genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to
litigation.”13
Further, the justification “must not rely on
overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities,
or preferences of males and females.”14
Since the 1970s, the United States Supreme Court has
struck down many laws on equal protection grounds,15 and has
only held that gender discrimination was permissible in a few
10
See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531, 533 (1994); Miss. Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
11
Claims against the federal government alleging a violation of equal protection
are brought under the Fifth Amendment. Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, which
contains an explicit mention of equal protection, the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee
of equal protection is implicit in its Due Process Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”); U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]”); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an
equal protection component prohibiting the United States from invidiously
discriminating between individuals or groups.”). Equal protection claims brought
against the federal government are analyzed the same way as equal protection
claims brought against state governments are analyzed. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,
420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (“This Court’s approach to Fifth Amendment equal
protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims
under the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
12
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446
U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
13
Id.
14
Id.; see also Hogan, 458 U.S. at 718; see generally Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199 (1977); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
15
See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. at 519; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 733 (finding a violation
of equal protection where a male was denied admission to an all-female nursing
school); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (finding Oklahoma’s statute, which
prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and females under the
age of 18, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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circumstances.16 Specifically, when gender based distinctions are
present in immigration laws, the Court has been reluctant to find
violations of equal protection.17 Because immigration statutes
are traditionally reviewed under a lower, deferential form of
scrutiny,18 the Court is faced with the dilemma of deciding
whether to review the law under this lower form of scrutiny or to
review the law under intermediate review.19
B.

Gender Discrimination in Immigration Statutes and the
Court’s Jurisprudence

1.

Deferring to Congress’s Broad Immigration Powers To
Justify a Gender Based Distinction

For the first time in Fiallo v. Bell,20 the Supreme Court was
presented with an equal protection challenge to an immigration
policy that contained a gender-based classification for deciding
whether or not to grant “special preference immigration status”
to aliens who qualified as “children” or “parents” of United States
16
The Court has upheld gender discrimination when the classification is based
on biological differences. See generally Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001); Michael
M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
17
See Nguyen, 553 U.S. at 73; Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 445 (1998);
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799−800 (1977).
18
See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792; Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 94, 101
n.21 (1976) (“[T]he power over aliens is of a political character and therefore is
subject only to narrow judicial review” and “the federal power over aliens is ‘quite
broad, almost plenary,’ and therefore the classification need[] only a rational basis.”
(quoting Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 333 F. Supp. 527, 531 (N.D. Cal. 1971)).
19
There are stark differences in reviewing a statute under rational basis as
opposed to reviewing a statute under intermediate scrutiny. First, the burden is
placed on different parties. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 75 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“[U]nder heightened scrutiny, ‘[t]he burden of justification is demanding and it
rests entirely on [the party defending the classification].’ Under rational basis
scrutiny, by contrast, the defender of the classification ‘has no obligation to produce
evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification.’ ” (first quoting
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533; then quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)).
Another difference is the scope of the judicial inquiry into the statute’s purpose. Id.
at 76–77 (“[Under heightened scrutiny,] the court must inquire into the actual
purposes of the discrimination, [while under rational basis review, a court may]
hypothesize interests that might support legislative distinctions.”). A third
significant difference is the fit between the means used and the ends served. Id. at
77 (“Under heightened scrutiny, the discriminatory means must be ‘substantially
related’ to an actual and important governmental interest. Under rational basis
scrutiny, the means need only be ‘rationally related’ to a conceivable and legitimate
state end.”).
20
430 U.S. 787 (1977).
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citizens.21 Because of the way “child” was defined in the
statute,22 all American citizens were entitled to bring their alien
children to the United States, except fathers of illegitimate
children.23 Similarly, all citizens were entitled to bring their
alien parents to the United States, except for those citizens who
were illegitimate children desiring to bring their fathers.24 The
appellants, three sets of unwed fathers and their illegitimate
children, had sought a special immigration preference either as
an alien father or alien child by virtue of their relationship with
the citizen or resident child or parent.25 They were each denied
this preference.26 The appellants sought an injunction against
enforcement of the statutory provision and challenged the
provision for violations of equal protection and due process.27
The Court denied the appellants’ challenge and refused to
review the statute with a higher form of scrutiny.28 The Court
explained that past cases “have long recognized the power to
expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute
exercised by the Government’s political departments largely
immune from judicial control.”29 The Court instead applied a

21

Id. at 788.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(D) (1970). “Child” is defined in part as “an unmarried
person under twenty-one years of age who is . . . an illegitimate child, by, through
whom, or on whose behalf a status, privilege, or benefit is sought by virtue of the
relationship of the child to its natural mother.” Id. (emphasis added).
23
Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 803 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
24
Id.
25
Id. at 790 (majority opinion).
26
Id.
27
Id. at 791. More specifically, the appellants argued:
[T]he statutory provisions (i) denied them equal protection by
discriminating against natural fathers and their illegitimate children “on
the basis of the father’s marital status, the illegitimacy of the child and the
sex of the parent without either compelling or rational justification”;
(ii) denied them due process of law to the extent that there was established
“an unwarranted conclusive presumption of the absence of strong
psychological and economic ties between natural fathers and their children
born out of wedlock and not legitimated”; and (iii) “seriously burden[ed] and
infringe[d] upon the rights of natural fathers and their children, born out of
wedlock and not legitimated, to mutual association, to privacy, to establish
a home, to raise natural children, and to be raised by the natural father.”
Id. (quoting Brief for Appellants at 11–12, Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), No. 756297, 1976 WL 181349).
28
Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 795.
29
Id. at 792 (quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)).
22
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“facially legitimate and bona fide” standard30 and deferred to
Congress’ judgment in enacting the statute, stating that “[t]his
distinction is just one of many drawn by Congress pursuant to its
determination to provide some but not all families with relief
from various immigration restrictions.”31 The Court reasoned
that since these distinctions were “policy questions entrusted
exclusively to the political branches of our Government,” the
Court had “no judicial authority to substitute [its] political
judgment for that of Congress.”32 The Court therefore upheld the
challenged provisions under this deferential form of review.33
2.

Using Biological Differences To Justify a Gender-Based
Distinction

More than two decades later, in Miller v. Albright, a
fractured Court upheld the constitutionality of § 1409(a)(4) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, which required an unwed
citizen father to establish paternity of his child before the child’s
eighteenth birthday in order to confer citizenship on that child.34
The law did not impose any similar affirmative steps to be taken
by the mother in order to establish a relationship with the child
and thus, was challenged for impermissibly discriminating on the

30
Id. at 794–95 (stating that when legislative immigration power is exercised
“on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will neither
look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification
against [the interest asserted by the challenging party]”).
31
Id. at 797. The Court then described the other distinctions Congress created
in the statute for determining whether the alien can qualify for preferential status.
See id. at 797–98 (“Congress has decided that children, whether legitimate or not,
cannot qualify for preferential status if they are married or are over 21 years of
age.”); id. at 798 (“Legitimated children are ineligible for preferential status unless
their legitimation occurred prior to their 18th birthday and at a time when they
were in the legal custody of the legitimating parent or parents.”); id. (“Adopted
children are not entitled to preferential status unless they were adopted before the
age of 14 and have thereafter lived in the custody of their adopting or adopted
parents for at least two years.”); id. (“[S]tepchildren cannot qualify unless they were
under 18 at the time of the marriage creating the stepchild relationship.”).
32
Id. at 798.
33
Id. at 799–800.
34
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 424–26 (1998); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4)
(1988). The precise question to be decided by the Court was “whether the
requirement in § 1409(a)(4)—that children born out of wedlock to citizen fathers, but
not citizen mothers, obtain formal proof of paternity by age 18, either through
legitimation, written acknowledgement by the father under oath, or adjudication by
a competent court—violates the Fifth Amendment.” Miller, 523 U.S. at 432.
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basis of gender.35 The plurality opinion, written by Justice
Stevens, was joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist.36 Justice
Stevens explained that the three government interests
advanced—“[E]nsuring reliable proof of a biological relationship
between
the
potential
citizen
and
its
citizen
parent . . . encouraging the development of a healthy relationship
between the citizen parent and the child while the child is a
minor[,] and the related interest in fostering ties between the
foreign-born child and the United States”—were all important
and the means provided by the statutory provision were “well
tailored to serve those interests.”37 Further, Justice Stevens
opined that § 1409(a)(4) was not based on a stereotypical genderbased classification and that the biological differences between
men and women “provide a relevant basis for differing rules for
governing their ability to confer citizenship on children born [out
of wedlock].”38 Therefore, unlike in Fiallo, where the Court
upheld the statute under a rationality review, here, the Court
upheld the statute under a more heightened scrutiny, examining
the interests and the means, but ultimately concluding that it
was constitutional.39
Justice O’Connor filed a concurring opinion in which Justice
Kennedy joined, concluding that the petitioner did not have
standing to raise her father’s gender discrimination claim.40
Justice Scalia also filed a concurring opinion in which Justice
Thomas joined, explaining that the Court had “no power to
provide the relief requested” by the petitioner because of
Congress’s broad immigration power.41 Two separate dissents
were filed, one by Justice Ginsburg in which Justices Souter and
Breyer joined,42 and another by Justice Breyer in which Justices
Ginsburg and Souter joined.43 Justice Ginsburg would have
struck down the provision for impermissibly discriminating
based on gender stereotypes.44 Justice Breyer would have

35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Miller, 523 U.S. at 426.
See id. at 423–45.
Id. at 436, 438, 440.
Id. at 444–45.
Id. at 437–45.
See id. at 445–52 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
See id. at 452–59 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See id. at 460–71 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id. at 471–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 460 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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similarly found gender discrimination after applying heightened
scrutiny.45
This scattered plurality opinion left open the
questions of whether § 1409(a)(4) violated equal protection
principles and which form of scrutiny should be applied to such
provision.
Recognizing the conflict between the circuit courts since the
Miller decision,46 only three years later, in Nguyen v. INS, the
Supreme Court again was faced with deciding the
constitutionality of § 1409(a)(4).47 In a five to four split, the
Court concluded that § 1409(a)(4) did not violate the guarantee of
equal protection.48 The majority opinion, led by Justice Kennedy,
classified this distinction as gender based and applied heightened
scrutiny.49 The Court held that both governmental interests
asserted:
[A]ssuring that a biological parent-child relationship
exists . . . [and] ensur[ing] that the child and the citizen parent
have some demonstrated opportunity or potential to develop not
just a relationship that is recognized, as a formal matter, by the
law, but one that consists of the real, everyday ties that provide
a connection between child and citizen parent, and, in turn, the
United States[,]50

were important, and that the means chosen to further those
interests were substantially related to the end.51

45

Id. at 477–78 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 58 (2001) (recognizing that “[s]ince Miller, the
Courts of Appeal have divided over the constitutionality of § 1409” and therefore
“granted certiorari to resolve the conflict”).
47
See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4) (2012). The statute required that the father satisfy
one of three options before the child’s eighteenth birthday in order for the child to
obtain citizenship: (1) “the person is legitimated under the law of the person’s
residence or domicile”; (2) “the father acknowledges paternity of the person in
writing under oath, or”; (3) “the paternity of the person is established by
adjudication of a competent court.” Id.
48
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 58–59.
49
Id. at 60–61. The Court applied heightened scrutiny, but did not categorically
declare that gender discrimination in immigration statutes must be subjected to
heightened scrutiny. The Court simply analyzed the statute under heighted scrutiny
first, and after finding that it survived, concluded that it must necessarily survive
rational basis review, the lowest standard, as well. Id. at 61 (“[W]e conclude that
§ 1409 satisfies [heightened scrutiny]. Given that determination, we need not decide
whether some lesser degree of scrutiny pertains because the statute implicates
Congress’[s] immigration and naturalization power.”).
50
Id. at 62, 64–65.
51
Id. at 70.
46
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As to the first interest, assuring that a biological parentchild relationship exists, the Court explained that mothers and
fathers are not similarly situated in this respect, because the
mother’s relation to the child is “verifiable from the birth itself,”
while the father “need not be present at the birth,” and his
presence “is not incontrovertible proof of fatherhood.”52 The
Court noted that “the use of gender specific terms takes into
account a biological difference between the parents,”53 which in
its past decisions has been a permissible basis for distinctions
based on gender.54
As to the second interest, the Court explained that “the
opportunity for a meaningful relationship between [a] citizen
[mother]” and a child born abroad “inheres in the very event of
birth,” whereas the opportunity does not always exist for the
father because “it is not always certain that the father will know
that the child was conceived, nor is it always clear that even the
mother will be sure of the father’s identity.”55 The Court went on
to state, “[w]ithout an initial point of contact with the child by a
father who knows the child is his own, there is no opportunity for
father and child to begin a relationship.”56 The Court concluded
its equal protection analysis by stating that the means employed
were “ ‘substantially related to the achievement of’ the
governmental objective[s] in question”57 without giving much
further explanation to how the means were substantially related.
The Court explained that given the determination that
§ 1409(a)(4) passed heightened scrutiny, it “need not decide
whether some lesser degree of scrutiny pertains because the
statute implicates Congress’[s] immigration and naturalization
power.”58
Justice O’Connor dissented, criticizing the Court’s failed
She noted the
attempt at heightened scrutiny review.59
majority’s failure to inquire into the actual purpose of

52

Id. at 62–63.
Id. at 64.
54
See generally Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
55
Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 65.
56
Id. at 66.
57
Id. at 70 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)).
58
Id. at 60–61.
59
Id. at 74 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“While the Court invokes heightened
scrutiny, the manner in which it explains and applies this standard is stranger to
our precedents.”).
53
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§ 1409(a)(4), and stated that the majority instead “hypothesize[d]
about the interests served by the statute.”60 Justice O’Connor
further explained that the “gravest defect” in the majority’s
reliance on the government’s asserted interests was the
“insufficiency of the fit between § 1409(a)(4)’s discriminatory
means and the asserted end.”61 She also opined that the
existence of comparable sex-neutral alternatives has provided a
reason to reject a gender-based classification and that the statute
appeared to perpetuate a stereotype about fathers and their
relationship with their children.62
All of this combined,
supported her dissenting argument that the majority failed to
properly scrutinize § 1409(a)(4).
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
§§ 1401(A)(7) AND 1409(C)
The Challenged Statutory Provisions

A.

The constitutionality of §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(c) of the INA
is the subject of the current split of authority between the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in United
States v. Flores-Villar,63 and the Second Circuit’s opinion in
Morales-Santana v. Lynch.64 In both cases, the petitioners claim
that the INA provisions, which impose different physical
presence requirements for conferring derivative citizenship on a
child based on a parent’s gender, constitute violations of equal
protection.65 Section 1401(a)(7) states:
The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United
States at birth: . . . a person born outside the geographical
limits of the United States and its outlying possessions of
parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the
60

Id. at 78.
Id. at 80.
62
Id. at 82, 88–89.
63
536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008).
64
804 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 2015).
65
See Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 523–24; Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d at 993.
Morales-Santana was born in 1962 and thus challenges the 1952 version of the INA,
whereas Flores-Villar was born in 1974 and thus challenges the 1970 edition of the
INA. See Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 524 (“The law in effect at the time of birth
governs whether a child obtained derivative citizenship as of his or her birth.”). The
current statute provides for a physical presence term of five years for unwed citizen
fathers, two of which are attained after the age of fourteen, and a term of one year
for unwed citizen mothers. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(g), 1409(c) (2012).
61
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United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was
physically present in the United States or its outlying
possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than ten
years, at least five of which were after attaining the age of
fourteen years.66

The statute, at first glance, appears to apply equally to all
parents, whether male or female. However, an exception to this
durational requirement is provided in § 1409(c) for unwed citizen
mothers:
Notwithstanding [§ 1409(a)(7)], a person born, on or after the
effective date of this chapter, outside the United States and out
of wedlock shall be held to have acquired at birth the
nationality status of his mother, if the mother had the
nationality of the United States at the time of such person’s
birth, and if the mother had previously been physically present
in the United States or one of its outlying possession for a
continuous period of one year.67

Thus, the effect of the statute is to impose a one-year physical
presence requirement on the mother if she was a United States
citizen, and a ten-year requirement on the father if he was the
United States citizen, in order to confer derivative citizenship to
the child. Presented with the exact same constitutional question,
the Ninth and Second Circuits arrived at different conclusions.68
B.

The Ninth Circuit Finds No Violation of Equal Protection

In United States v. Flores-Villar, the appellant, Ruben
Flores-Villar, was born in Mexico to a sixteen-year-old United
States citizen father and a non-United States citizen mother.69
Flores-Villar was brought to San Diego when he was two months
old and was subsequently raised there by his father and
grandmother.70 After being convicted of a number of crimes and
being removed from the United States on several occasions,
Flores-Villar was charged with being a deported alien found in

66
8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1952). The versions of the INA provisions discussed in
this note, 1952 and 1970, are identical. Compare 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(7), 1409(c)
(1970), with 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(7), 1409(c) (1952).
67
8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (1952).
68
See discussion infra Sections II.B–C.
69
United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d per
curiam, 564 U.S. 210 (2011) (4-4 decision).
70
Id.
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the United States after deportation.71 He moved to present
evidence that he was a United States citizen by way of derivative
citizenship from his father.72 The district court denied the
motion and convicted Flores-Villar.73 He appealed his conviction
and challenged §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(c) on the grounds that the
provisions constituted violations of equal protection.74
In its analysis, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
relied almost exclusively on the United States Supreme Court’s
opinion in Nguyen v. INS, which held that § 1409(a)(4) of the
INA, requiring unwed citizen fathers, but not unwed citizen
mothers, to legitimize the child in order to confer citizenship on
The court considered the
that child, was constitutional.75
government’s first interest—assuring a link between the unwed
citizen father and the United States, to the child76—and
analogized it to the interest advanced in Nguyen.77 The court
reasoned that although the means employed by the provision in
Nguyen and the provision in this case are different, “the
government’s interests are no less important, and the particular
means no less substantially related to those objectives, than in
Nguyen.”78 The court quoted the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Nguyen: “Unlike an unwed mother, there is no assurance that
the father and his biological child will ever meet, or have the
kind of contact from which there is a chance for a meaningful
However, the court gave no
relationship to develop.”79
explanation as to why the means were no less important, nor did
it address how the physical presence requirement at issue here
was substantially related to the government’s interest in
assuring a link between the father, the United States, and the
child,80 or how the distinction between mothers and fathers was
justified by this interest.

71

Id. Flores-Villar was charged with violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b).
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 994–95.
75
Id. at 995–98.
76
Id. at 995–96.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 996.
79
Id. at 995.
80
The Court briefly states, “[t]he residence differential . . . furthers the objective
of developing a tie between the child, his or her father, and this country.” Id. at 997.
72
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The Ninth Circuit then addressed the next asserted
interest—avoiding statelessness.81 Quoting a prior opinion, the
court stated, “[o]ne obvious rational basis for a more lenient
policy towards illegitimate children of U.S. citizen mothers is
that illegitimate children are more likely to be ‘stateless’ at
birth.”82 In explaining how the means substantially relate to the
end, the court simply stated, “[t]he residence differential is
directly related to statelessness; the one-year period applicable to
unwed citizen mothers seeks to insure that the child will have a
nationality at birth.”83 Finding that the statute withstood
heightened scrutiny, the court held that §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(c)
did not violate equal protection.84
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the
decision of the Ninth Circuit in a 4-4 split without publishing an
opinion.85 Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration of the
However, since a 4-4 split does not establish a
case.86
precedent,87 lower courts are free to choose whether to follow the
decision reached in Flores-Villar.88
C.

The Second Circuit Finds a Violation of Equal Protection

Recently, in Morales-Santana v. Lynch, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit decided the constitutionality of the same
provisions of the INA that were challenged in Flores-Villar, but
came to the opposite result.89 The petitioner, Morales-Santana,
was born in the Dominican Republic to a Dominican mother and
a United States citizen father.90 His father, who was born in
81
Id. at 997; see Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520, 531 (2d Cir. 2015)
(“[A] child born out of wedlock abroad may be stateless if he is born inside a country
that does not confer citizenship based on place of birth and neither of the child’s
parents conferred derivative citizenship on him.”).
82
Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d at 996.
83
Id. at 997.
84
Id.
85
564 U.S. 210 (2011).
86
Id.
87
See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216 (1942) (“[T]he lack of an
agreement by a majority of the Court on principles of law involved prevents it from
being an authoritative determination for other cases.”).
88
Recently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Morales-Santana case,
and will hear oral arguments on November 9, 2016. Regardless of the Court’s
decision, Section III.B asserts that there should be a new, gender-neutral provision,
which would better serve the purposes of the statute.
89
Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520, 528 (2d Cir. 2015).
90
Id. at 524.
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Puerto Rico and obtained United States citizenship pursuant to
the Jones Act,91 resided in Puerto Rico until twenty days before
In 2000, Morales-Santana was
his nineteenth birthday.92
subjected to removal proceedings after being convicted of various
felonies.93 After his application for withholding of removal based
on derivative citizenship was denied, Morales-Santana filed a
motion to reopen based on a violation of equal protection.94 The
Board of Immigration Appeals denied his motion, and the Second
Circuit was asked to review the Board’s decision.95
At the outset, the court declared that it would apply
“heightened scrutiny” to the law because it discriminates based
on gender.96 The court rejected the government’s request to
review the provision under rational basis like in Fiallo,
distinguishing the rights at issue.97
In Fiallo, Congress’s
“ ‘exceptionally broad power’ to admit or remove non-citizens”
was implicated, while here, the issue is a claim of “pre-existing
citizenship at birth,” which does not implicate Congress’s power
to admit or remove non-citizens.98
The court then closely examined the importance of each
interest, reflective of true heightened scrutiny review.99 The
Government asserted two interests in support of the statute’s
gender-based distinction: (1) ensuring a sufficient connection
between the child and the United States, and (2) preventing
statelessness.100 The court recognized the first interest as
important, however, it pointed out the Government’s failure to
justify the provision’s differential treatment of mothers and
91
See 8 U.S.C. § 1402 (2012) (“All persons born in Puerto Rico on or after April
11, 1899 . . . are declared to be citizens of the United States.”).
92
Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 524. If Morales-Santana’s father stayed in
Puerto Rico past his nineteenth birthday, Morales-Santana would have been able to
claim derivative citizenship through him. See § 1401(a)(7) (stating that a person can
claim derivative citizenship if that person was “born outside the . . . United
States . . . of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United
States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United
States or its outlying possessions for a period or period totaling not less than ten
years, at least five of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years”).
93
Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 524.
94
Id. at 524–25.
95
Id. at 523.
96
Id. at 528.
97
Id.
98
Id. (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 794 (1977)).
99
Id. at 530–35.
100
Id. at 530–31.
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fathers.101 The court found that there was no reason that unwed
fathers would need more time in the United States than unwed
mothers would need to ensure a connection to the United
States.102 Therefore, it concluded that “the statute’s genderbased distinction is not substantially related to the goal of
ensuring a sufficient connection between citizen children and the
United States.”103 The court addressed the fact that its decision
conflicted with the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Flores-Villar and
stated, “The Ninth Circuit provided no explanation for its
conclusion, and the Government provides none here.”104
The court then turned to the Government’s second asserted
interest, preventing statelessness, and again agreed that the
However, the court found that
interest was important.105
preventing statelessness was not Congress’s actual purpose in
establishing the physical presence requirements of the INA, and
further that, even if it was, the gender-based distinctions in the
statute were not substantially related to preventing
statelessness.106 The court noted that the availability of genderneutral alternatives persuaded it in its finding that the means
were not substantially related to the ends, and ultimately, that
the statutory provisions could not survive intermediate
scrutiny.107

101
Id. at 530 (“[The Government] offers no reason, and we see no reason, that
unwed fathers need more time than unwed mothers in the United States prior to
their child’s birth in order to assimilate the values that the statute seeks to ensure
are passed on to citizen children born abroad.”).
102
Id.
103
Id. at 531.
104
Id. at 530.
105
Id. at 531. Preventing statelessness is a well-established and important
governmental interest. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160–61
(1963).
106
Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 531; see also id. at 532–33 (“Neither the
congressional hearings nor the relevant congressional reports concerning the 1940
Act contain any reference to the problem of statelessness for children born abroad.
The congressional hearings concerning the 1952 Act are similarly silent about
statelessness as a driving concern.”); id. at 533 n.10 (“Although [a Senate Report
dated January 29, 1952] reflects congressional awareness of statelessness as a
problem, it does not purport to justify the gender-based distinctions in the physical
presence provisions at issue in this appeal.”).
107
Id. at 535. The Court noted prior case law indicating that the availability of
gender-neutral alternatives meant that the statute could not survive intermediate
scrutiny. See id. at 534; Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980)
(invalidating a gender-based classification where a gender-neutral approach would
serve the needs of both classes); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 282–83 (1979) (“A gender-
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The court concluded by describing the remedy to be
administered after a finding that the statutory provisions were
unconstitutional.108
It
noted
that
“binding
precedent . . . caution[ed] [the court] to extend rather than
contract benefits in the face of ambiguous congressional intent”109
and, therefore, severed the ten-year requirement, requiring every
unwed citizen parent to satisfy the one-year requirement
instead.110 The effect of this severance confirmed MoralesSantana’s citizenship as of his birth.111
III. DIFFERENT PHYSICAL PRESENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR UNWED
MOTHERS AND FATHERS IN THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY
ACT VIOLATES BASIC EQUAL PROTECTION PRINCIPLES AND
SHOULD BE REPLACED BY A GENDER-NEUTRAL PROVISION
A.

Intermediate Scrutiny Should Be Applied in Reviewing
§§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(c) of the INA

The first problem that arises in analyzing the
constitutionality of the gender-based derivative citizenship
provisions of the INA is that there is still no established United
States Supreme Court precedent for the level of scrutiny to be
used.112 Although the Miller court analyzed the provision at
issue under intermediate scrutiny, it only issued a plurality
decision and thus no precedent was established.113 Similarly,
although the Nguyen Court decided the constitutionality of the
based classification which, as compared to a gender-neutral one, generates
additional benefits only for those it has no reason to prefer cannot survive equal
protection scrutiny.”).
108
Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 535–37.
109
Id. at 537 (“Indeed, we are unaware of a single case in which the Supreme
Court has contracted, rather than extended, benefits when curing an equal
protection violation through severance.”).
110
Id. at 535–36.
111
Id. at 538.
112
Similarly to the Nguyen court, the Flores-Villar court decided the
constitutionality under intermediate scrutiny, but does not categorically decide that
intermediate scrutiny is the form of review that should apply. See United States v.
Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Accordingly, we conclude that even
if intermediate scrutiny applies, §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409 survive . . . [and
§§] 1401(a)(7) and 1409 satisfy rational basis review as well.”); Nguyen v. INS, 533
U.S. 53, 61 (2001) (“Given [the] determination [that the statute withstands
heightened scrutiny], we need not decide whether some lesser degree of scrutiny
pertains . . . .”).
113
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 423 (1998).
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statute under intermediate scrutiny, it did not categorically
declare intermediate scrutiny to be the applicable standard.114
Instead, the Court explained that since the statute passed the
intermediate form of scrutiny, it would necessarily pass a lower
form of scrutiny.115
Despite this lack of precedent, §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(c)
should be reviewed under intermediate scrutiny. First, it is
important to note that these provisions do not implicate
“Congress’s ‘exceptionally broad power’ to admit or remove nonInstead,
citizens,” like the provisions in Fiallo did.116
§§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(c) would confirm an individual’s “preexisting citizenship” and thus would not involve any questions of
admission or removal of noncitizens.117 Thus, the review of
§§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(c) are not governed by the deferential
standard of review in Fiallo.118
Second, all gender-based
classifications are reviewed under intermediate scrutiny.119 The
provisions at issue explicitly make the physical presence
requirement for an unwed citizen mother one year, and make the
requirement for an unwed citizen father ten years.120 Therefore,
because this classification is made on the basis of gender, it is
subject to intermediate review.121 The government must show
that the physical presence requirements serve “important

114
See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 61; supra note 58 and accompanying text. Because
the court found that the statute did not pass intermediate scrutiny, it follows that
the statute would not survive a lower form of scrutiny, therefore, the court did not
need to decide which form of scrutiny applied, as the statute would fail both.
115
Id. at 60–61 (explaining that given the determination that § 1409(a)(4)
passed heightened scrutiny, it “need not decide whether some lesser degree of
scrutiny pertains because the statute implicates Congress’[s] immigration and
naturalization power”).
116
Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 528 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 794
(1977)). The provision at issue in Fiallo granted special preference immigration
status to aliens who qualified as “children” or “parents” of United States citizens. See
Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 788.
117
Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 528; see also Villegas-Sarabia v. Johnson, 123
F. Supp. 3d 870, 881–82 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (“Petitioner claims that under a
constitutional interpretation of the challenged statutes, he is a citizen as of the date
of his birth. He is not challenging the denial of an application for immigration status
or any other government action that could be said to implicate the congressional
‘power to admit or exclude foreigners’ at issue in Fiallo.”).
118
Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 528.
119
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531, 533 (1994).
120
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(7), 1409(c) (2012).
121
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531, 533.
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governmental objectives” and that those requirements are
“substantially related to the achievement of [the important
governmental] objectives.”122
The physical presence requirements of §§ 1401(a)(7) and
1409(c) do not survive intermediate review because the
requirements are not substantially related to the government’s
asserted interests: (1) ensuring a sufficient connection between
the child born abroad and the United States, and (2) preventing
statelessness.123 Although the prevention of statelessness has
been recognized as an important governmental interest,124 this
interest does not justify the different physical presence
requirements. 125 Statelessness is defined as a lack of any
nationality.126 A child born out of wedlock is stateless when, for
example, the child is born in “a country that does not confer
citizenship based on place of birth and neither of the child’s
parents conferred derivative citizenship” on that child.127 While
the one-year requirement imposed on unwed citizen mothers may
further the interest of preventing statelessness when the child is
born to an unwed citizen mother, it does not further the interest
of preventing statelessness when the child is born to an unwed
citizen father. This durational requirement for unwed mothers is
premised on the idea that “children of unwed citizen mothers
fac[e] a greater risk of statelessness than the children of unwed
citizen fathers.”128 However, there is no support for this view.129
122
Id. at 533 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724
(1982)).
123
Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 527–28; United States v. Flores-Villar, 536
F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2008).
124
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160–61 (1963); MoralesSantana, 804 F.3d at 531.
125
The court in Morales-Santana discredits the prevention of statelessness as
the purpose of the statute. 804 F.3d at 531–34. However, a Senate Report dated
January 29, 1952 mentions statelessness. See id. at 533 n.10 (“This provision
establishing the child’s nationality as that of the . . . mother regardless of
legitimation or establishment of paternity is new. It [e]nsures that the child shall
have a nationality at birth.”). Thus, since there is some evidence that preventing
statelessness may have been a purpose in enacting § 1409(c), this Note does not
discredit that purpose, but instead, shows why the different physical presence
requirements do not substantially further that purpose.
126
The UN Refugee Agency, Ending Statelessness, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.
org/en-us/stateless-people.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2017).
127
Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 531.
128
Id. at 533.
129
Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars on Statelessness in Support of Petitioner at
28, United States v. Flores Villar, 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-50445), 2010
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In fact, the opposite appears to be true. Notably, a large number
of countries do not confer citizenship on a child born to an unwed
mother, leaving the child stateless if the United States citizen
father cannot meet the ten-year durational requirement imposed
by the statute.130 To apply the one-year durational requirement
only to United States citizen mothers does not remedy the
problem of statelessness and, therefore, is not substantially
related to that interest.
Similarly, the government’s asserted interest in ensuring a
sufficient connection between the child born abroad and the
United States is not substantially furthered by the different
physical presence requirements.
Like the prevention of
statelessness, it is clear that this interest is also important.131
However, there is no justification for imposing a longer physical
presence requirement on the father. If the government believes
that a child’s father must reside in the United States for ten
years to ensure a connection between the child and the United
States, how does it follow that a mother only needs to reside for
one year in order to ensure this same connection?132 There is
simply “no reason[] that unwed fathers need more time than
unwed mothers in the United States prior to their child’s birth in
order to assimilate the values that the statute seeks to ensure
are passed on to citizen children born abroad.”133
Further, the government’s justification in support of the
different physical presence requirements is misplaced. In both
circuit cases, the government relied on Nguyen in arguing that
the longer durational requirement imposed on unwed citizen
fathers is justified by biological differences between males and
females.134 The government explained that while the opportunity
for a connection with the United States “inheres in the very event
of birth” for the child of an unwed citizen mother, the same
WL 2569160 (“There is no support for the . . . assertion that the risk of statelessness
for non-marital children of U.S. mothers was or is much higher than for U.S. fathers
of non-marital children born abroad, or indeed any higher at all.”).
130
Id. at 23–28.
131
Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 530 (“As both parties agree, [the] interest [of
ensuring a sufficient connection between the child and the United States] is
important.”).
132
Not to mention, this single year of residency could have occurred when the
mother was one year old.
133
Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 530.
134
Id.; Brief for United States at 21, United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 U.S. 990
(9th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-50445), 2010 WL 3392008.
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opportunity does not exist for a child of an unwed citizen father,
because there is no assurance that the father will even know
about his child.135 Under these circumstances, the government
explained there would be no opportunity for a connection
between the father and child and, in turn, the United States.136
But this argument is irrelevant to the provisions at issue. Here,
the father has already taken the affirmative step of legitimizing
the child as required by the previous provisions of the statute.137
Because of this, the child knows of both the father and the
mother. The opportunity for a relationship to develop with the
parent and, in turn, the United States, is equally present.
Therefore, to impose a longer physical presence requirement on
the father does not further the interest of assuring a connection
between the child and the United States.
Finally, the availability of gender-neutral alternatives is
generally fatal to intermediate scrutiny analysis.138 With regard
to §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(c), there have been at least two
instances in which gender-neutral legislation has been proposed,
but both times these proposals have not been incorporated into
the INA.139 One example dates as far back as 1933, in a letter
written by Secretary of State Cordell Hull to the Chairman of the
House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.140
Secretary Hull proposed a gender-neutral alternative to the INA
provisions suggesting that a child born out of wedlock abroad to
an American parent who has resided in the United States be a
citizen by birth if there is “no other legal parent under the law of
the place of birth.”141 Also in 1933, a bill was presented to
135

Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 65 (2001).
Id.
137
8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4) (2012). These provisions requiring an unwed father to
prove paternity were held to be constitutional in Nguyen. The statute required that
the father satisfy one of three options before the child’s eighteenth birthday in order
for the child to obtain citizenship: (1) “the person is legitimated under the law of the
person’s residence or domicile”; (2) “the father acknowledges paternity of the person
in writing under oath, or”; (3) “the paternity of the person is established by
adjudication of a competent court.” Id.
138
See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980); see also
Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 534.
139
See Villegas-Sarabia v. Johnson, 123 F. Supp. 3d 870, 887 (W.D. Tex. 2015)
(“In the lead-up to what would become the 1934 Act, Congress was twice presented
with gender-neutral bills that would have addressed the problem of statelessness
with respect to mothers as well as fathers.”).
140
Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 534.
141
Id.
136
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Congress providing for citizenship of a child born abroad if that
child’s “father or mother is at the time of the birth of such child a
citizen of the United States.”142 Because of this availability of
gender-neutral alternatives as well as the failure of the physical
presence requirements to substantially further the government’s
interests, §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(c) fail intermediate scrutiny
review and therefore are unconstitutional.
B.

A Gender-Neutral Solution

While the Morales-Santana court reached the right
conclusion of unconstitutionality, the remedy provided by the
court was insufficient. The Morales-Santana court severed the
ten-year physical presence requirement and left the one-year
requirement to apply to all unwed parents.143 Although this
remedy is consistent with equal protection principles, it is not
sufficient to serve the purposes of the statute. Instead, Congress
should create a new, gender-neutral statute that would effectuate
both the prevention of statelessness and the assurance of a
sufficient connection between the child and the United States.
The current statute, as amended in 1986, provides for a
physical presence term of five years for unwed citizen fathers,
two of which are attained after the age of fourteen, and a term of
one year for unwed citizen mothers.144 Thus, the gender-based
142
American Citizenship Rights of Women: Hearing on S. 992, S. 2760, S. 3968
and S. 4169 Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on Immigration, 72nd Cong. 2
(1933).
143
See Morales-Santana, 804 F.3d at 535–36. The remedial options of the courts
are limited by the severance provisions in the statute. Id. at 536 (alteration in
original) (“The 1952 Act contains a severance clause that provides: ‘If any particular
provision of this Act, or the application thereof to any person or circumstance, is held
invalid, the remainder of this Act . . . shall not be affected thereby.’ ”). Thus, courts
can only do so much to remedy the problem of gender discrimination. Id. (“The
clause makes clear that only one of the provisions in § 1409, rather than both,
should be severed.”).
144
8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2012) states:
The following shall be nationals and citizens at birth: . . . a person born
outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying
possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of
the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically
present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or
periods totaling not less than five years, at least two of which were after
attaining the age of fourteen years.
While U.S.C. § 1409(c) still states:
Notwithstanding [8 U.S.C. § 1406(g),] a person born . . . outside the United
States and out of wedlock shall be held to have acquired at birth the
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distinctions are still present in the statute today. The first part
of the gender-neutral solution would be to impose the five-year
term on any unwed citizen parent, regardless of gender. There is
no exact formula for how long a parent must live in the United
States in order to assimilate the values of the United States and
therefore promote a connection between the child and the United
States. However, a term of five years is a reasonable amount of
time.
It is a compromise between the onerous ten-year
requirement imposed by the 1952 Act and the lax one-year
requirement resulting from the Morales-Santana decision. A
five-year term is also consistent with the physical presence
requirement for naturalization, which requires a person seeking
citizenship to live in the United States for five years prior to their
application.145
Although the five-year physical presence requirement would
substantially further the government’s interest in assuring a
connection between the child and the United States, it would not
adequately address the problem of statelessness. For example,
the problem of statelessness would still persist if the United
States citizen parent does not meet the five-year requirement,
and the child is born in a country that does not recognize
citizenship by place of birth. This concern can be alleviated by
creating an exception that would apply only if the citizen parent
did not meet the five-year physical presence requirement and
there was no other way to confer citizenship of another country
on the child. In that case, the exception would provide for a oneyear physical presence requirement on the United States citizen
parent in order to confer derivative citizenship to the child.
Although a one-year term may be insufficient to ensure a
connection between the child and the United States, it would
apply only in the limited circumstance just described, and thus
would not pose too much of a threat to that interest.

nationality status of his mother, if the mother had the nationality of the
United States at the time of such person’s birth, and if the mother had
previously been physically present in the United States or one of its
outlying possessions for a continuous period of one year.
See supra note 65.
145
8 C.F.R. § 316.2(a)(3) (2016) (“[T]o be eligible for naturalization, an alien
must establish that he or she . . . [h]as resided continuously within the United
States . . . for a period of at least five years after having been lawfully admitted for
residence.”).
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In sum, the proposed statute would appear as follows:
(1) The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United
States at birth: . . . a person born outside the United States and
its outlying possessions to parents one of whom is an alien, and
the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of
such person, was physically present in the United States or its
outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less
than five years, at least two of which were after attaining the
age of fourteen years.
(2) Notwithstanding section (1), a person born outside the
United States and out of wedlock to a United States citizen
parent shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality of
that parent if the parent had previously been physically present
in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a
continuous period of one year, and no other citizenship of such
child can be attained in any other manner.

Thus, this general five-year requirement and the one-year
exception would adequately serve both interests of ensuring a
sufficient connection between the child and the United States
and preventing statelessness.
CONCLUSION
Recall the hypothetical in the Introduction of this Note.
Under the new proposed statute, X would be a citizen of the
United States regardless of his citizen parent’s gender. Under
the general rule, Y would not be a citizen of the United States,
unless there was no other way to confer citizenship on him. If
that were the case, then Y would be a citizen based on the oneyear residency of his parent, regardless of that parent’s gender.
As this Note discussed, laws such as §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(c) of
the INA cannot withstand equal protection analysis because they
impermissibly discriminate based on gender. If the United
States wishes to grant citizenship to a certain class of citizens, it
must do so without gender distinctions, absent an important
interest that is substantially furthered by the distinction.
Because preventing statelessness and ensuring a connection
between a child born abroad and the United States are not
substantially furthered by the gender based distinctions in the
INA, §§ 1401(a)(7) and 1409(c) are unconstitutional and should
be remedied by a gender-neutral statute.

